Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories.

Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories.

The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...) dualism, implying that current cognitive neuroscientists are Cartesian dualists. Against this claim, we argue that the fallacy cannot be committed within Cartesian dualism either, for this doctrine does not allow for an intelligible way of asserting that a soul is part of a human being. Also, the authors' Aristotelian essentialistic outlook is at odds with their Wittgensteinian stance, and we were unconvinced by their case against explanatory reductionism. Finally, although their Wittgensteinian stance is congenial with radical behaviorism, their separation between philosophy and science seems less so because it is based on a view of philosophy as a priori. The authors' emphasis on the a priori, however, does not necessarily commit them to rationalism if it is restricted to conceptual or analytical truths. (shrink)

We propose a model mechanism for the initiation and spatial positioning of teeth primordia in the alligator, Alligator mississippiensis. Detailed embryological studies by Westergaard and Ferguson have shown that jaw growth plays a crucial role in the developmental patterning of the tooth initiation process. Based on biological data we develop a dynamic patterning mechanism, which crucially includes domain growth. The mechanism can reproduce the spatial pattern development of the first seven teeth primordia in each half jaw of A. mississippiensis. The (...) results for the precise spatio-temporal sequence compare well with experiment. Simulation of the model also predicts that certain transplantations can alter the spatial sequence of teeth primordia initiation. (shrink)

This volume gives an overview of the subject of mathematical logic, placing primary emphasis on theory instead of the development of skills. It contains chapters on the history of logic, first and second order quantification theory, metatheory, and some of the philosophical implications of recent work in the field. Needless to say, none of these topics is treated in any great detail owing to the space limitations. Care has been taken by the author, however, to insure that his discussions do (...) not trade mistakes and clarity for brevity. Each section provides the reader with a grasp of the central issues and adequate information to approach more advanced literature with some confidence. The treatment of topics such as recursive functions, Skolem's paradox for set theory, and the place of mathematical logic in the study of philosophy is rarely found in introductory treatments. No special training in either mathematics or Logic is presupposed by any of the sections. Ample exercises are included which are, in some cases, quite challenging. Answers to many of these are provided. In addition, there is also a useful annotated bibliography.--R. P. M. (shrink)

Perhaps no work since John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice has attracted as much recent attention as Robert Nozick’s case for a minimal state—an ingeniously argued critique, not only of antinomian individualism, but also of liberal and socialist contractualism. It might be added that the book is no solace either to more conservative political theorists, who lament state incursion into private life, but whose political structures exhibit either actual or potential constriction of human life. Nozick’s book is both a searching (...) examination of the limitations of utilitarian consequentialism and the redistributivism of Rawls. His essential theme is that "a minimal state limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts etc., is justified; that any more extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right." It is also Nozick’s contention that the coercive power of the state should not be used paternalistically to prohibit activities to people for their own protection, or to force some citizens to aid others. The last part of the book is a framework for Nozick’s utopia, and it is in this section that an essentially theoretical approach, amplified by little political or sociological data, exhibits its defects. One suspects that almost all states started with simplistic hopes for minimal coercive activity, and succumbed almost inevitably to the metastasis of function as socio-political life grew in size and complexity. Night watchmen become more than night watchmen when more than watching is needed. Moreover, Nozick’s utopia would seem to necessitate, at least by implication, coercive redistributivism and some kind of compensatory or levelling taxation process. This reviewer is not sure that he understands precisely what Nozick considers correct property theory in a state of nature. The author modestly asserts the tentative, incomplete, and conjectural nature of his work. But the taxed and manipulated citizen who grows in sympathy for the sentiments of Proudhon’s famous litany should welcome this highly literate and well argued case.—R.P.M. (shrink)

Contractualism is one of the most promising ‘centers of gravity’ in business ethics. In this guest editorial we provide a concise roadmap to the field, sketching contractualism’s historic and disciplinary antecedents, the basic argumentative structure of the contract model, and its boundary conditions. We also sketch two main dimensions along which contributions to the contractualist tradition can be positioned. The first dimension entails positive versus normative theorizing – does a given contribution analyze the world as it is or how it (...) ought to be? The second dimension involves four different levels of analysis that are commonly employed in contractualist business ethics: the nano, micro, meso, and macro levels. We then proceed to position the articles comprising this special issue along these two dimensions. (shrink)

Background: Although fair distribution of healthcare services for older patients is an important challenge, qualitative research exploring clinicians’ considerations in clinical prioritisation within this field is scarce. Objectives: To explore how clinicians understand their professional role in clinical prioritisations in healthcare services for old patients. Design: A semi-structured interview-guide was employed to interview 45 clinicians working with older patients. The interviews were analysed qualitatively using hermeneutical content analysis. Participants: 20 physicians and 25 nurses working in public hospitals and nursing homes (...) in different parts of Norway. Results and interpretations: The clinicians struggle with not being able to attend to the comprehensive needs of older patients, and being unfaithful to professional ideals and expectations. There is a tendency towards lowering the standards and narrowing the role of the clinician. This is done in order to secure the vital needs of the patient, but is at the expense of good practice and holistic role modelling. Increased specialisation, advances and increase in medical interventions, economical incentives, organisational structures, and biomedical paradigms, may all contribute to a narrowing of the clinicians’ role. Conclusion: Distributing healthcare services in a fair way is generally not described as integral to the clinicians’ role in clinical prioritisations. If considerations of justice are not included in clinicians’ role, it is likely that others will shape major parts of their roles and responsibilities in clinical prioritisations. Fair distribution of healthcare services for older patients is possible only if clinicians accept responsibility in these questions. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory is a pertinent example of a framework that has been stretched over many conceptual contexts and that has been applied to a wide variety of empirical phenomena. A pressing issue involves the scope of application of stakeholder theory, however, because it is not a comprehensive ethical scheme or problem-solving algorithm. We begin our search for the boundaries of stakeholder management by identifying a presently under-acknowledged yet major underlying assumption, notably that the approach is rooted in voluntary action and (...) association. Building on this presumption, we argue that firm - stakeholder relationships are best to be understood in contractualist terms; i.e. as voluntary arrangements between two or more parties seeking mutual benefit. This assertion subsequently allows us to identify three boundary conditions applying to stakeholder theory: (1) the parties should be sufficiently autonomous; (2) their interests need to be alignable; and (3) they should be capable of living up to their commitments. We substantiate these criteria with evidence from a collective case study of buyer - supplier relationships in the Dutch manufacturing sector, demonstrating that the stakeholder management model fails when these boundary criteria are violated. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Organization theory and business ethics are essentially the positive and normative sides of the very same coin, reflecting on how human cooperative activities are organized and how they ought to be organized respectively. It is therefore unfortunate that—due to the relatively impermeable manmade boundaries segregating the corresponding scholarly communities into separate schools and departments, professional associations, and scientific journals—the potential symbiosis between the two fields has not yet fully materialized. In this essay we make a modest attempt at establishing further (...) connectivity by surveying the terrain covered by the two disciplines jointly, as if the boundaries between them did not matter. We commence by providing a concise overview of the organization theory discipline for interested non-specialists from the field of business ethics. Next, we proceed to point out four research themes commonly investigated by members of both communities, and also a variety of organization-theoretical perspectives on each. In the final part of this essay we explore what organization theory has to offer business ethics, and what the boundaries of that potential contribution are. We warn skeptical readers in advance that the spirit and tone of our essay is most definitely upbeat, as we are convinced that the potential for symbiosis between the two fields is vast and inspiring, even though it has only been unleashed partially and incidentally thus far. (shrink)

Contractualism conceives of firm-stakeholder relations as cooperative schemes for mutual benefit. In essence, contractualism holds that these schemes, as well as the normative principles that guide and constrain them, are ultimately ratified by the consent and endorsement of those subject to them. This paper explores the empirical validity of a contractualist perspective on firm-stakeholder relations. It first develops a typology of firm-stakeholder contracting problems. It subsequently confronts this typology with empirical data collected in an interview study of concrete stakeholder management (...) practices, involving in-depth research interviews with forty-four managers working in the Dutch financial services industry. The findings of this theory-building study suggest that there are limits to the applicability of the contract model in the context of stakeholder management, and that disregarding either the model or its limitations may lead to highly ineffective firm-stakeholder relations. (shrink)

Although Toffler has not written an in-depth philosophical analysis of social problems, he certainly has written a highly readable popular diagnosis of the phenomenon of cultural change which social philosophers should be considering, and has given a synoptic view of contemporary culture similar to Pitirim Sorokin's popular Crisis of Our Age in the forties. Toffler's thesis is "that there are discoverable limits to the amount of change that the human organism can absorb, and that by endlessly accelerating change without first (...) determining these limits, we may submit masses of men to demands they simply cannot tolerate." Future shock is, therefore, both the physical and psychological impairment caused by reluctance and inability to absorb the rapid changes that an age of discontinuity produces. Psychic distress is identified in Leon Festinger's arresting phrase, "cognitive dissonance," the rejection or denial of information that challenges preconceptions. Physical distress is analyzed by such interesting research tools as the Rahe Life-Change Units Scale which attempts to correlate change factors with physical health. The philosophic base of modern life is seen in a Heraclitean or Bergsonian flux which ontologizes change itself and sees social and political conflict inevitably provoked by rapid change confronting an older society whose substantialist structures reflect more the stable and enduring values of an older culture. It is from the vantage point of change theory that Toffler explains the contemporary turmoil in domestic, social, political, and religious realms; and although he does not employ the more formal idiom of a Vico or Spengler in the discussion of Zeitgeist, he recognizes thought and life style as even more significant than ever in a culture in which communication is so widespread and immediate. He uses the imagery of eight hundred 62-year lifetimes to illustrate man's history of the last 50,000 years, noting the comparative stability of the previous segments and the bewildering rapidity of change cycle of idea, application, and diffusion in the last sixty-year period. He analyzes progressively the accelerative thrust that creates conflict between cultures and generations; describes the typical attitudes of citizens in an Age of Transience towards time, things, places, people, organization, and ideas; and sees "modular" man as a being for whom permanence of marriage, career, educational values, and convictions yields to "temporariness." Organizations in such a climate are characterized by lateral rather than hierarchical power relationships in which "super-industrial man," committed more to his craft than to his company, assumes more decision-making responsibility in an "adhocracy" of transient values and relationships. Toffler interestingly sees bureaucracy on the decline, technology as contributing to plurality of choice rather than to standardization, and to a kinetic imagery of impermanence in aesthetics. For the most part, Toffler, the diagnostician, resists the temptation to be the pleader. His happily infrequent divagations produce less than satisfactory critiques of family life, education, and genetic engineering. It is inevitable that this book will be criticized by specialists as bewilderingly diffuse, and verging at times on science fiction; it is possible too that the strategy of "social futurism" suggested by the author will elicit less than undiluted enthusiasm, and that inexact references to Toynbee and Maritain may be questioned. But the essential purpose of this volume to give a unified vision of contemporary culture in terms of the adaptive reaction to change--all this has been admirably realized. And one feels that the author indeed possesses the vision and research tools for particularized study in the areas treated here quite generally.--R. P. M. (shrink)

This introduction to formal logic is one of the few paperbacks available that provides a broad survey of the field. In addition to a clear presentation of sentential and first order quantificational logic, there is a discussion of the philosophical significance of recent work by Church, Gödel, and Tarski. The proof technique employed throughout is the indirect argument. Since proofs of this sort can be converted into mechanical tests of validity, it is easier than most for a beginning student to (...) grasp. Furthermore, this style of argument has long been recognized as the most obvious method of showing arguments in ordinary language to be invalid. Interesting treatments of the construction of decision machines, the nature of formal systems, and the application of logic to mathematics are included in the last section. Numerous exercises are included for which some answers are provided.--R. P. M. (shrink)

This handsome volume is an outgrowth of Giambattista Vico, An International Symposium, edited by Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden White and published in 1969, in which Vichian influences were explored by distinguished scholars in diverse fields. The original volume was meant to be exploratory in nature, analyzing Vico’s sometimes obscure thought in terms of historical theory and contemporary humanistic relevance.

Background Regarding controversial medical services, many have argued that if physicians cannot in good conscience provide a legal medical intervention for which a patient is a candidate, they should refer the requesting patient to an accommodating provider. This study examines what US physicians think a doctor is obligated to do when the doctor thinks it would be immoral to provide a referral. Method The authors conducted a cross-sectional survey of a random sample of 2000 US physicians from all specialties. The (...) primary criterion variable was agreement that physicians have a professional obligation to refer patients for all legal medical services for which the patients are candidates, even if the physician believes that such a referral is immoral. Results Of 1895 eligible physicians, 1032 (55%) responded. 57% of physicians agreed that doctors must refer patients regardless of whether or not the doctor believes the referral itself is immoral. Holding this opinion was independently associated with being more theologically pluralistic, describing oneself as sociopolitically liberal, and indicating that respect for patient autonomy is the most important bioethical principle in one's practice (multivariable ORs, 1.6–2.4). Conclusions Physicians are divided about a professional obligation to refer when the physician believes that referral itself is immoral. These data suggest there is no uncontroversial way to resolve conflicts posed when patients request interventions that their physicians cannot in good conscience provide. (shrink)

The essays in this volume are based on addresses given during a colloquium on free logic, modal logic, and related areas held at the University of California in 1968. The majority of the contributors are well known for their writings in these fields and their papers are as illuminating as they are technical. In the first paper, Lambert and Bas C. Van Fraassen apply free logic to several controversies in quantified modal logic. One of these is Putman's argument that 'Nothing (...) is both red and green all over' can be had as a theorem of modal logic. Lambert and Van Fraassen provide a counter example to this claim and then show that the argument only holds in systems allowing possible individuals. Jaako Hintikka's essay also deals with 'free' modal logics in much the same way as Hintikka's other papers and discusses some of the criticisms of Quine of the entire enterprise of quantified modal logic. In another paper, H. Leblanc and R. K. Meyer provide truth-value semantics for the theory of types and hence an alternative semantic structure for functional calculi of any order. In addition to these essays, there are papers by R. Thomason and Dana Scott on modal logic, J. Vickers on probability logic, and Peter Woodruff on truth value gaps. To anyone interested in these various areas this collection is sure to be welcome.--R. P. M. (shrink)

This one-volume text in Christian ethics is an attempt by L. Harold DeWolf, Professor of Systematic Theology at Wesley Theological Seminary at a comprehensive treatment of contemporary ethical theory and practice. The author defines his subject within a specifically Christian context; traces the relativistic revolt against moral norms; gives a brief resume of Hebrew and Christian ethics; presents a rather rigorous interpretation of natural law theory; formulates a series of ethical guidelines based essentially on rational responsibility, consistency, ideal values, social (...) concern, and ultimate reality. He then indicates how through ecclesia and community these principles might be applied to such diverse problems as marriage and the family, environment, cultural depersonalization, civil disobedience and war. To those who feel that ethics should be a reasoned science free of theological commitment this work will seem too ambitious; to those who feel that existential ethical judgments should proceed from the total intellectual and religious resources of the individual, it will stand as an updated if necessarily diffuse outline of contemporary Christian ethical theory, formulated with insight and sensitivity.—R. P. M. (shrink)

Although it now seems clear that no verificationalist [[sic]] account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for meaningful discourse is adequate, many philosophers still hope that some general criterion will be formulated. This book is an attempt to supply such a theory. It opens with a discussion of the various views of meaninglessness that have been proposed during this century. Taking operationalism, verificationalism, [[sic]] and the category mistake theory in turn, Erwin provides an analysis of their shortcomings. In addition to (...) the now stock criticisms of the verification theory, an argument is set out to the effect that no workable verificationalist [[sic]] position can theoretically be developed. Erwin also casts doubt on the view of meaninglessness as the lack of a truth value, and attacks Strawson's famous theory of reference failure and truth value gaps. The author's position emerges as equating meaninglessness with "a priori falseness." This would, of course, make all self contradictions meaningless, and the denial of any meaningless statement true. Both of these consequences, as well as the criterion from which they spring, are bound to be controversial. Perhaps the chief virtue of this book is that it succinctly presents all the opposing positions on the subject and gives a detailed analysis of each. Hence, even if Erwin's thesis is incorrect, his book is still worthwhile.--R. P. M. (shrink)

This useful anthology contains selections from classical as well as contemporary authors on the subject of meaning. Although these are not arranged chronologically, the reader is made aware of the difference of purpose and approach between those philosophers trying to bolster and empiricism by a theory of meaning and those philosophers and linguists who find an intrinsic interest in the subject. Of particular interest is the juxtaposition of an essay by William Alston in which the shortcomings of the referential, ideational (...) and behavioral meaning theories are discussed with selections from representative philosophers of each view. Two papers from proponents of the speech-act model of language give a clear introduction to the basics of what is considered by many to be a major breakthrough in the philosophy of language. The last two entries constitute a dialogue of the utility of the analysis of semantic components. Essays on the relation of meaning to philosophy and linguistics by the editors are also included.--R. P. M. (shrink)

This is a study in what Naess calls the "new historiography of science," i.e., the view that science is and has been discontinuous, non-accumulative, and somewhat arbitrary. Readers familiar with the controversy between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper will undoubtedly note that Naess attempts to achieve a synthesis of their opposed positions. Against Popper, Naess argues there is no standard of rejection and refutation for theories in science that will bear the weight of both the history and present practice of (...) the various disciplines. Instead there are many such standards and herein lies the "pluralistic aspect" of the scientific enterprise. But contrary to Kuhn, irrationalism is not found to be the alternative to a Popperian framework. What is required according to Naess is a broader conception of rationality and decision making than classical philosophers and historians of science were willing to embrace. The outline of such a conception is presented here. Naess also favors encouragement of a methodological pluralistic approach since he finds that the possibilities are almost endless. Nor is the history of science exempt from this invitation. In a final chapter Naess turns his thesis to historiography itself and explores the consequences of pluralism and possibilism in this field.—R.P.M. (shrink)

Despite the title, this book is really an introduction to the study of the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the significance of his way of philosophizing for problems in social and political thought. As the author points out, Wittgenstein was not a political theorist; he "did not write about society or history or revolution or alienation". The author, obviously conversant with the work and methodology of Wittgenstein, has written a work ad mentem magistri, not attempting to isolate specific doctrine (...) but to indicate how a philosopher, convinced of the centrality of language in human life, would reflect on the problems of associative life. Language is seen, not as a system of labels, but as the carrier of human culture that both asserts the individuality and communality of men, and illuminates "the nature of innovation and continuity in human affairs." The author sees the later Wittgenstein as rejecting his earlier satisfaction with the Tractatus, being careful to point out that Wittgenstein did not question ethical aesthetic and religious values, as much as to claim that they could not be talked about in a philosophically meaningful way. Roughly, the second half of the book concerns itself with social and political implications, the quarrel between Socrates and Thrasymachus on the nature of justice being seen as paradigmatic of contemporary concerns about the objectivity of social values. The book is significant not because it develops a political philosophy, for it quite obviously does not; but because it suggests possibilities and indicates a developing respect in Wittgenstein for metaphysics and objectivity, and a desire to know and understand that objectivity by means of language analysis.—R.P.M. (shrink)